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The Automobile Warranty Crisis:
Would Enactment of Proposed
Amendments to the Magnuson-Moss




Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act' in 19742 to facilitate under-
standing of consumer product warranties, to improve competition in
the marketing of consumer products, to prevent deception, and to
encourage informal settlement of warranty-related disputes.' Theo-
retically, the statute, which delineates with specificity the duties that
suppliers assume when voluntarily offering written warranties on
consumer products,4 affords greater protection to consumers. For
* A.B., Bryn Mawr College 1977; J.D., Dickinson School of Law 1980. Law Clerk for
the Honorable Maxwell E. Davison, Court of Common Pleas, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). Title I of the Act deals with consumer
warranties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976). Title II encompasses the increased jurisdiction
and powers of the Federal Trade Commission. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44-46, 49-50, and 56-58 (1979
Supp.).
For informative studies of Title I of the Act see Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Ac-An
Analysis of the Efficacy of Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer Production Tool, 18
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73 (1978); Denicola, The Magnuson-Maoss Warranty Act." Making Con-
sumer Product Warranty a Federal Case, 44 FoRDnHm L. REV. 273 (1975); Magnuson, Fair
Disclosure in the Marketplace of Warranty Promises-Truth in Warrantiesfor Consumers, 8
U.C.C. L.J. 117 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fair Disclosure]; Roberts, The Magnuson-Maoss
Federal Warranty Act and Failure of Its Essential Purpose, Uniform Commercial Code 2-
719(2), 33 Bus. LAW. 1845 (1978); Schroeder, Private Actions Under the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1978); Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the
Tables on Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 391 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Caveat Emptor];
Strasser, Magnuson-Moss Warranty.- An Overview and Comparison With U CC Coverage, Dis-
claimers, and Remedies in Consumer Warranties, 27 MERCER L. REV. 111 (1976); Note, Con-
sumer Product Warranties Under the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Uniform Commercial Code,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1977).
2. On December 19, 1974 S. 356 cleared Congress. President Ford signed the bill into
law on January 4, 1975. CQ ALMANAC, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327 (1974).
3. 119 CONG. Rac. 972 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Moss). See also H.R. Rap. No. 1107,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702.
4. Manufacturers need not supply written warranties on their products. When they vol-
example, by mandating that the terms and conditions of the two per-
mitted types of wr:itten warranties be disclosed in clear language, the
Act attempts to promote consumer awareness and selectivity. Practi-
cally, the competition that ensues from developing consumer sophis-
tication encourages manufacturers of home appliances to proffer
"full" rather than "limited" warranties.'
In the automobile industry, however, the Act has achieved no
comparable success, largely because each of the "Big Three"6 auto-
mobile manufacturers offers only "limited" warranties on its prod-
ucts. 7 Statistically, fewer than two percent of all new automobiles
are currently sold with "full" warranties.' As a result, automobile
purchasers are generally deprived of the broad range of protection
afforded by the Act, a deprivation underscored by the fact that the
automobile is recognized as one of the largest single purchases made
by consumers. 9
Further weakening the position of automobile purchasers, the
proffer by manufacturers of "limited" warranties may also foreclose
significant remedies prescribed by each state's commercial code.
Since "limited" warranties often purport to provide exclusive reme-
dies, purchasers could be precluded under subsection 2-719(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) from seeking revocation and
untarily provide such written guarantees, however, the warranties must conform to the man-
dates of the federal Act. See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
5. Before presenting a bill to amend current warranty laws, Senator Metzenbaum
(Ohio) noted: "A significant number of companies, including many of the manufacturers of
such large and expensive products as home applicances currently offer such comprehensive
protection to the consumer. In fact, full warranties are the rule rather than the exception in the
major home appliance industry." 125 CONG. REC. S. 11691 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979) (remarks
of Sen. Metzenbaum). But see Note, Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31
STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1979). For a detailed explanation of the distinction between "full" and
"limited" warranties, see § III C infra.
6. The General Motors Corp., the Ford Motor Co., and the Chrysler Corp. are com-
monly termed the "Big Three" automobile manufacturers.
7. The American Motors Corp., however, offers "full" warranties on its automobiles.
125 CONG. REC. S.11691 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
8. Conversely, more than 98% of all new automobiles are sold with only "limited" war-
ranties. Id
9. Id Rocketing car prices, which exacerbate the poor warranty protection afforded
consumers, prompted Sen. Metzenbaum (Ohio) to write:
In hearings last week before the House Subcommittee on Consumer Protection,
the Federal Trade Commission and several consumer and public interest groups tes-
tified in support of similar legislation. In his testimony, FTC Chairman Michael
Pertschuk noted that increasingly higher prices for new cars 'make the consequences
of owning a lemon even worse for the unlucky few.' The lemon owner, forced to sell
a car earlier than usual, can lose several thousand dollars and, 'the trade-in inevitably
becomes a used lemon to the next buyer.'
Dear Colleague Letter, Sen. Metzenbaum For Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, Washington, D.C. (July 16, 1979) (on file in office of Dick. L. Rev.).
Similarly, in his remarks preceding House subcommittee hearings, Congressman Eck-
hardt (Tex.) specifically noted that expenditures for private transportation equal those for food
in the urban working family's budget. The 19.3% income outlay for transportation occurs
despite disproportionately large increases in food prices and other basic necessities. AUTO
REPAIR: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
damages.' ° Additionally, judicial uncertainty over the proper appli-
cation of U.C.C. subsection 2-719(3) could bar purchasers from re-
covering consequential property damages."
The repeated refusals by automobile manufacturers to provide
"full" warranties are exacerbated by the documented failure of auto-
mobile manufacturers to design adequately and repair their prod-
ucts. Preliminary results of a Federal Trade Commission-sponsored
survey of 1976 vehicles, for example, indicate that nearly thirty per-
cent of all new automobiles are sold with defects, compared with
seven percent of warranted consumer products overall.' 2 In addi-
tion, forty percent of motor-vehicle problems require repeated visits
to a dealer, while thirty percent take longer than a month to cor-
rect. '3 Upon final resolution of attendant automobile-reparation dis-
putes, twenty-five percent of purchasers remain dissatisfied but enjoy
no further remedy. " In support of these startling figures, the Better
Business Bureau's 1978 statistical summary demonstrates that nearly
sixty percent of automobile-related complaints concern new vehicles
still under warranty. '
5
Clearly, the present automobile-warranty crisis requires imme-
diate consideration and rectification. This article examines the ini-
tial passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as an attempt to
protect the consumer and discusses its subsequent failure in the auto-
mobile industry. Additionally, proposed amendments to the Act are
analyzed in the context of the present warranty crisis. The potential
for correcting these abuses under U.C.C. section 2-719 is also consid-
ered. Finally, in an attempt to present a viable solution to the crisis,
legislative and judicial measures are suggested.
II. The Warranty Situation Prior to the Enactment of Federal
Legislation
A. Protection Available to Consumers Under the UC. C.
Prior to the enactment of federal warranty legislation, each
10. See § V infra. See also note 44 and accompanying text infra.
1I. See § V infra. See also note 45 and accompanying text infra.
12. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess., REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE REPAIRS 29 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM.].
13. Id
14. Id Notably, in a 1968 study, the FTC determined that "in some instances manufac-
turers have not lived up to their unstated but no less real obligations under their guaran-
tees. . . .They have failed to discard a servicing dealer or independent servicing agency
which does not provide acceptable warranty service. They have failed to give more than cava-
lier treatment to consumer appeals for assistance when the retailer has refused to honor the
guarantee." H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-23 reprintedin [19741 U.S. CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7702, 7709 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. Clearly, the enactment of federal war-
ranty legislation has insufficiently aided buyers, since problems currently faced by automobile
consumers parallel difficulties apparent in 1968.
15. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM., supra note 12, at 29.
state's commercial code afforded consumers some legal redress. 16
Because the sale of consumer products constituted transactions in
goods,' 7 such sales clearly fell within the ambit of U.C.C. Article 2.
As a result, the various U.C.C. provisions dealing with warranties,
buyers' remedies, and disclaimers of liability governed the rights of
aggrieved consumers. Since these provisions still often determine
rights and remedies in litigation over "limited" warranties,' 8 a cur-
sory examination of them will be helpful.
1. Types of Warranties Available. -Express warranties are cre-
ated under section 2-3131' of the U.C.C. by written or oral20 state-
ments that both relate to the goods and become part of the basis of
the bargain.2' An affirmation of fact, a promise, a description, a
sample or a model may provide the requisite statement. 22 Further-
more, a seller need neither intend to create a warranty nor use artful
terms such as "warranty" or "guarantee;" mere advertising or utili-
zation of generic titles can constitute an express warranty.
23
Implied warranties of merchantability arise under section 2-314
whenever goods are sold by a merchant who deals in goods of that
kind.2 4 Only goods fit for the ordinary purposes for which they are
16. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
17. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(1) and 2-102.
18. See Barr v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Novosel v.
Northway Motor Car Corp., 460 F. Supp. 541 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46
Or. App. 521, 524 n.2, 612 P.2d 316, 318 n.2 (1980). See also Pratt v. Winnebago Ind., Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 463 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
19. U.C.C. § 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or
model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purport-
ing to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty.
20. See Butcher v. Garret-Enumclaw Co., 20 Wash. App. 361, 581 P.2d 1352 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Durbano Metals, Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, Inc., - Utah - 574 P.2d
1159 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 380 A.2d 569 (Del. Super. 1977);
Drier v. Perfection, Inc., - S.D. _ 259 N.W.2d 496 (1977).
23. See, e.g., Scheuler v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., I Kan. App. 2d 525, 571 P.2d 48
(1977).
24. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
generally used25 and conforming to any promises or affirmations of
fact made on the container or label are deemed merchantable.26 Ba-
sically, the actual or presumed expertise of the merchant, the buyer's
reliance on the seller's judgment, the consumer's lack of bargaining
position to insist upon express warranties, and the purchaser's gen-
eral inability to inspect goods for defects justify the imposition of
implied warranties.27
Implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose are recog-
nized under section 2-315.28 When any seller 29 at the time of con-
tracting has reason to know3° that goods are required for a particular
purpose and also that the buyer is relying on his skill or judgment to
furnish suitable goods, an implied warranty exists. Notably, this
warranty may arise in conjunction with the implied warranty of
merchantability.3'
2. Purchaser's Remedies for Breach of Warranty. -A pur-
chaser 32 may revoke his acceptance3 3 when a defect, of which he was
justifiably unaware or which he reasonably assumed would be cured
after acceptance, substantially impairs the value of the goods to him.
Revocation must occur within a reasonable time, however, and
before the goods deteriorate. Upon justifiable revocation of accept-
respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or
drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may re-
quire; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label
if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
25. Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Machine Co., 65 Mich. App. 426, 237 N.W.2d
488 (1975); Waddell v. American Breeders Service, Inc., 161 Mont. 221, 505 P.2d 417 (1973).
26. See Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under the Commercial Code
and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Acts, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583, 600
(1979).
27. Id at 599.
28. U.C.C. § 2-315 provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modi-
fied under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
29. By mentioning "seller" rather than "merchant," U.C.C. § 2-315 goes beyond the
scope of § 2-314.
30. See, e.g., Sass v. Spradlin, 66 Ill. App. 3d 976, 23 Ill. Dec. 670, 384 N.E.2d 464 (1978);
Valley Iron & Steel Co. v. Thorin, 278 Or. 103, 562 P.2d 1212 (1977).
31. See U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 2.
32. No distinction is meant in this article between buyer and purchaser.
33. See U.C.C. § 2-608.
ance, a purchaser may cancel the contract, recover his purchase
price, and "cover."34 Alternatively, a purchaser may revoke and re-
cover damages for non-delivery; such tripartite damages encompass
the amount already paid, the difference between the market price at
the time of breach and the contract price, and any incidental or con-
sequential damages." Under either option for revocation, a pur-
chaser retains a security interest in the goods.36
Conversely, were a buyer to retain non-conforming goods rather
than revoke his acceptance, he could sue for breach of warranty.
Damages would embrace any incidental or consequential losses in
addition to the difference between the value of the goods accepted
and the goods warranted.37 Significantly, no exemplary damages or
attorneys fees are available in any suit invoking the U.C.C.
38
3. Disclaimers and Limitations of Remedy. -Sellers, however,
may reduce their potential liability for defective products under two
distinct provisions. Sellers can insulate themselves from liability by
disclaiming, modifying or excluding warranties entirely under sec-
tion 2-316 and concurrently limiting the types of remedies available
to buyers under section 2-719.
Even though section 2-316 disallows negations or limitations of
liability that are inconsistent with any express warranties provided,39
implied warranties enjoy no similar statutory shield. Mentioning
merchantability and, in the case of a writing, displaying the dis-
claimer conspicuously, sufficiently exclude an implied warranty of
merchantability according to subsection 2-316(2). 40 Similarly, con-
spicuously excluding or modifying an implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose in a writing suffices to disclaim the second type
of implied warranty. Utilization of expressions such as "with all
faults" and "as is" also normally eradicates warranty liability.4'
34. "Covering" allows the buyer to procure substitute goods and recover damages
amounting to the difference between the contract and cover prices. See U.C.C. § 2-712(2).
35. See U.C.C. § 2-713.
36. See U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
37. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2)(3).
38. See note 82 and accompanying text infra.
39. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words
or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reason-
able as consistent with each other, but subject to the provisions of this Article on
parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable.
40. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied war-
ranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that
"There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
41. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a).
Not only may warrantors exclude implied warranties to reduce
their potential liability, but under subsection 2-719(1)42 they may
contemporaneously limit the remedies available to purchasers upon
breach of warranty. For example, a seller could specify that repair
or replacement of the non-conforming parts represents the buyer's
sole recourse. Were this remedy expressly agreed to be exclusive, a
purchaser would merely be promised an opportunity to receive a de-
fect-free product eventually and the seller would only be obligated to
keep trying to deliver the desired product.
4 3
Notwithstanding this statutory endorsement of disclaimers and
limitations of remedy, the U.C.C. affords minimal protection to con-
sumers, when circumstances cause an exclusive or a limited remedy
to "fail of its essential purpose." If an exclusive remedy fails of its
essential purpose, all U.C.C. remedies become available under sub-
section 2-719(2). 4 Furthermore, no consequential damages may be
limited or excluded if so doing appears unconscionable.45 High liti-
gation costs combined with inconsistent application of the section 2-
719 remedies minimize the protection afforded. Currently, not only
do various courts evaluate failure of an essential purpose differently,
but they disagree on whether consequential damages may properly
be awarded for such failure.
B. The Documented Needfor Greater Consumer Protection
Basically, because state commercial codes permitted broad dis-
claimers of warranty liability and provided consumers with uncer-
tain remedies under section 2-719, warranties remained noticeably
inadequate during the 1960's and early 1970's. In particular, express
warranties were carefully drafted to limit or eliminate implied war-
ranty protection through the artful use of permitted disclaimers.46
"Taking away in fine print what the bold print ostensibly gave" be-
42. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the
preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for
those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recover-
able under this article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or
parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is expressly
agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
43. See Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 581-82 (1969).
44. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
45. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not.
46. See Caveat Emptor, supra note 1.
came standard practice, largely because buyers initially failed to
comprehend fully the implications of warranty disclaimers. 7 Only
later, when purchasers eventually discerned that their warranties
were virtually worthless, did they begin to vocalize their displeasure.
Notably, by 1965, the large number of consumer complaints
lodged against automobile warrantors encouraged the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to investigate the efficacy of automobile warran-
ties. The Commission's staff report, published in 1968, read as fol-
lows:
1. Performance of manufacturers and dealers under the war-
ranty has not achieved the levels implied by the warranty.
2. Failure to perform up to warranted standards has been
encountered in the manufacture and the preparation of cars under
the warranty.
3. An excessive amount of service under the warranty does
not meet the standards of consumer acceptability. °"
A second report issued by the Commission in 1970, reiterated a con-
cern for the growing dichotomy between warranty promises and
warranty performance. This study concluded by advocating that
federal legislation resolve warranty and repair problems.4 9
In response to the mounting criticism of manufacturers and re-
tailers the federal government sponsored similar studies on con-
sumer product warranties. Because so many warrantors allegedly
failed to honor their warranties, President Johnson commissioned a
Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service in his February 6,
1968 Presidential message on consumer matters.5" Besides examin-
ing the basic problem, this task force intended to encourage volun-
tary improvement of warranties. Eleven months after its formation,
the President's Task Force submitted a report containing three il-
luminating findings. First, the substantive terms of the 200 warran-
ties analyzed appeared ambiguous. Second, all of the fifty
manufacturers selected for scrutiny attempted to disclaim liability
for implied warranties. Last, since no viable method existed for per-
suading manufacturers to provide meaningful warranties volunta-
rily, federal legislation appeared necessary.5'
Appreciating the need for congressional action, politicians be-
gan to propose bills for warranty regulation in the late 1960's. Initial
attempts at enacting such legislation, however, were unsuccessful.
Both the Ninety-First and Ninety-Second Congresses entertained
considerable testimony in support of two bills but adjourned without
47. H.R. REP. supra note 14, at 7706.
48. Id at 7708-09.
49. See Caveat Emptor, supra note I, at 393.
50. Id
51. Fair Disclosure, supra note I, at 119.
taking action.52
Finally in 1974, the Ninety-Third Congress responded to con-
sumer needs by passing the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act. 3 Significantly, in September
of 1974, while Senate and House members were still discussing the
feasibility of modifying the proposed warranty legislation, Congress-
man Moss released the results of a committee survey of 200 warran-
ties.5 4 As well as emphasizing the general deficiencies inherent in
the warranties studied, the report noted that warranties covering
products manufactured in 1974 continued to be riddled with ambi-
guities and loopholes. By December of 1974, the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act cleared Congress. President Ford signed the bill into
law on January 4, 1975.
III. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act's Attempt to Protect
Consumers
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act attempts to protect consum-
ers both by setting minimum federal standards for consumer product
warranties and by empowering the FTC to promulgate and enforce
additional regulations for written warranties. Furthermore, rather
than preempting state warranty laws, the Act complements them.
Focusing on the statutory provisions, Title 15 defines the scope of
the, enactment and details various disclosure requirements, warranty
standards, and remedies available to consumers.
A. Scope of the Act
Generally, manufacturers need furnish no warranties under the
Act. 6 Only whe written warranties are voluntarily offered to con-
sumers purchasing consumer products do the mandates of the Act
apply.57 The definitional section of the Act, FTC regulations, and
judicial pronouncements delineate the scope of the legislation more
specifically.
1. Written Warranties. -Two types of writings constitute
"writings warranties" under section 2301(6). First, the statutory defi-
nition embraces any written affirmation of fact or written promise
made by the supplier in connection with the sale of the consumer
52. Caveat Emptor, supra note 1.
53. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975). Title I appears at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1976); Title II appears at 15 U.S.C.§§ 44-46, 49-50, and 56-58 (1977 Supp.).
54. CQ ALMANAC, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 331 (1974).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
56. The Act applies only to a "warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer
by means of a written warranty." Id § 2302(a),(b)(l)(B)(2).
57. Warranties for articles manufactured prior to July 4, 1975 remain wholly unaffected
by the enactment. See notes 92 and 93 and accompanying text infra.
product, which relates to the material or workmanship of the prod-
uct and promises either that the product is defect-free or that it will
meet a certain level of performance over a specified period of time.58
Second, any undertaking in writing by a supplier to refund, repair,
replace or otherwise remedy a specified defect also serves as a "writ-
ten warranty." With either type of writing, the affirmation or under-
taking must form part of the basis of the bargain between the
supplier and buyer for purposes other than mere resale of the prod-
uct.5 9
2. Consumer Product. -Section 2301(1) defines "consumer
product" as any tangible personal property6" that is both distributed
in commerce and normally used for personal, family or household
purposes. Whether use of the product is "not uncommon" deter-
mines status, with ambiguities resolved in favor of coverage.6' An
FTC regulation similarly defines "consumer product" when applied
to rules concerning disclosure of warranty terms and pre-sale availa-
bility of warranties.6 z
3. Consumer. -According to section 2301(3), a "consumer"
may be a buyer or transferee of a consumer product or, alternatively,
a person entitled by warranty language or state law to enforce a war-
ranty.63 While the definition excludes a purchaser buying solely for
resale purposes, a corporation purchasing products normally used
for personal, family or household purposes enjoys consumer status
for the purposes of this Act."4
4. Commerce. -"Commerce" encompasses both interstate
trade, traffic, commerce or transportation and intrastate activities af-
58. In contrast to an express warranty under the U.C.C., an affirmation that guarantees
satisfactory performance for an unspecified period of time would not constitute a written war-
ranty under the Act. 16 C.F.R. § 700.3(a) (1977).
59. Rather than merely adopting the indefinite U.C.C. standard for determining "basis of
the bargain," the FTC provides a new interpretation: to form the basis of the bargain a war-
ranty must be conveyed at the time of sale without additional charge for the warranty benefit.
[d §700.11(b). "Puffing" and statements of general policy, however, remain exempt. (d
§ 700.5(a).
60. Even though the Act does not cover realty, any personalty attached to realty may
constitute a "consumer product." Thus, air conditioners, furnaces, and water heaters are cov-
ered. Id § 700.1(c). Whether state laws classify such items as fixtures is irrelevant. Id
§700. 1(d).
61. Id § 700.1(a). Neither urethane foam products nor roof coating materials would
satisfy the statutory definition of a "consumer product." See Jameson Chem. Co. Ltd. v. Love,
- Ind. App. - 403 N.E.2d 928 (1980).
62. Essentially, the FTC specifically excludes products purchased exclusively for com-
mercial or industrial uses from this definition. 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.1(b), 702.1(b) (1977).
63. In order to be a "consumer," a transferee must receive the warranted product during
the duration of any implied or written warranty applicable to the product. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3)
(1976).
64. R. MILLER & D. TORTORICE, THE MAGNUSON-Moss WARRANTY AcT 151 (1979).
fecting interstate commerce under section 2301(14). As explained by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. American Build-
ing Maintenance Industries,65 this term is defined more broadly in
Magnuson-Moss than when cited in other federal legislation.66 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress deliberately defined "commerce"
broadly to make the FTC's jurisdiction under the warranty law coex-
tensive with the constitutional power of Congress under the Com-
merce Clause.
B. Warranty Disclosure Requirements
Since legislators consider disclosure to be a panacea for con-
sumer misunderstanding and deception, the Act mandates full and
clear disclosure of written warranty terms.67 Section 2301(b) autho-
rizes the FTC to regulate disclosure. Consequently, two FTC-
promulgated rules currently delineate the requisite disclosure by sell-
ers for products costing consumers more than fifteen dollars. One
rule requires that specified types of information be included in a dis-
closure document; the other, that sellers make the text of any written
warranty available to buyers prior to sale.68
Specifically, in the first rule, which requires that language used
in warranties be simple and readily understood, the FTC prescribes
disclosure of the following information: first, the parties to whom
the warranty is extended, if enforceability is limited to the original
consumer purchaser or otherwise; second, which parts or properties
are covered and excluded by the warranty; third, what the warrantor
will and will not do in the event of a defect; fourth, the duration of
the warranty and the date protection commences, particularly if the
latter differs from the purchase date; fifth, a detailed explanation of
the steps a consumer should follow to obtain warranty service; sixth,
the availability of any informal dispute settlement mechanism; sev-
enth, any durational limitation on implied warranties; eighth, any
exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages; and
last, statements indicating that state laws may both nullify such limi-
tations or exclusions and grant the purchaser additional rights.69
The second rule forces sellers and warrantors to make the text
of written warranties available to buyers prior to sale. Any of the
following four methods of displaying the warranty will generally sat-
isfy a seller's duties under this rule: conspicuously displaying the
65. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
66. Id at 277 n.6.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1976).
68. 16 C.F.R. §§ 701.3(a) & 702.3 (1977).
69. Furthermore, when a warrantor utilizes owner registration cards, return of which is
or reasonably appears to be a condition precedent to warranty coverage, the effect of noncom-
pliance must be disclosed in the document. Id § 701.4 (1977).
text of the warranty near the warranted product, advertising the
presence of and maintaining indexed binders that contain copies of
the warranty in each department where the product is sold, clearly
displaying the package if the warranty is printed on it, and placing
notices containing warranty language near the warranted product.7 °
C Warranty Designation and Attendant Standards
In order to foster consumer awareness, section 2303 requires
that all written warranties for consumer products costing more than
ten dollars be conspicuously labelled either "full" or "limited."
"Full" warranties must meet the section 2304 minimum federal stan-
dards, which are fourfold. First, a warrantor must remedy any de-
fect in or nonconformity of the product with the written warranty
within a reasonable time and without charge. Second, no durational
limit may be imposed on implied warranties. Third, any limitation
of consequential damages for breach of written or implied warran-
ties must be conspicuous. Last, after a reasonable number of unsuc-
cessful attempts to remedy malfunctions, the "full" warrantor must
permit the customer to elect either a refund for or a replacement of
the "lemon." Unless a warrantor can demonstrate the reasonable-
ness of imposing additional duties, a consumer need only notify the
seller of a defect. Written warranties that fail to meet any of these
minimum standards must be denominated as "limited."7
D. Disclaimers of Implied Warranties
Section 2308(b) permits a supplier to disclaim or limit an im-
plied warranty in only one, specified instance. Notably, a "limited"
warrantor may abbreviate implied warranties to expire with an ex-
press warranty of reasonable duration. To be valid, however, the
limitation must be conscionable, set forth in clear and unmistakable
language, and displayed prominently on the face of the warranty.
When a product is covered by both "full" and "limited" warranties,
this limitation may not be made.72 Any attempted limitation of an
implied warranty in violation of this section becomes ineffective
under both the Act and state law.7 3
70. This rule also prohibits sellers from obscuring or removing warranty disclosure
materials unless such removal is necessary for store window displays, fashion shows or picture
taking. Id § 702.3(a)(2).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2) (1976).
72. R. MILLER & D. TORTORICE, supra note 64, at 154 (1979).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (1976).
E. Remedies
1. Informal Settlement. -According to the Act, congressional
policy encourages the establishment of informal settlement mecha-
nisms for resolving consumer complaints fairly and expeditiously.
7 4
A warrantor who requires that consumers resort to the informal pro-
cedure before commencing suit could effectively preclude customers
who refuse to seek informal remedy from suing under the Act.75
When a warrantor voluntarily chooses to establish the informal
settlement mechanism, FTC regulations control.76 Recently, the
FTC promulgated regulations detailing six basic duties of warran-
tors offering such devices.7 7 First, warrantors must inform consum-
ers about the availability of, and the procedures for, utilizing the
mechanism both in the warranty and at the time of dispute. Second,
warrantors must explain to the consumer that although he may need
to utilize the informal mechanism before pursuing judicial remedy
under the Magnuson-Moss Act, he may still seek relief under state
commercial laws if he does not desire an informal resolution of the
dispute. 78 Third, warrantors must provide addresses necessary for
obtaining informal aid, descriptions of the mechanism, and notice of
applicable time limits. Fourth, when warrantors receive complaints
directly, these guarantors of performance must notify consumers of
their intentions within a reasonable time. Fifth, warrantors must re-
spond promptly to requests for relevant information. Last, warran-
tors must abide by the informal dispute settlement mechanism in
good faith.79
In addition to formulating rules for warrantors, the FTC deter-
mined minimum requirements for the mechanism itself.8" Not only
should the mechanism be adequately funded and competently
staffed, but it must also be available to consumers without post-sale
charge. Furthermore, no member of the mechanism may have direct
involvement with the warrantor. Additional regulations prescribe
certain operational and recordkeeping duties.
2. Judicial Enforcement of the Act
(a) Private remedies. -After giving a warrantor a reasonable
opportunity to cure his failure to comply with the Act, a dissatisfied
74. Id § 2310(a)(1).
75. Id § 23 10(a)(3)(C). Alternatively, if a consumer resorts to the informal remedy, any
decision rendered by the mechanism becomes admissible into evidence in court. Id
76. Id § 2310(a)(2).
77. 16 C.F.R. § 703.2 (1977).
78. See § II supra.
79. 16 C.F.R. § 703.2 (1977).
80. Id §§ 703.3-703.8.
consumer may bring a civil suit under the Act for "damages and
other legal and equitable relief."'' 8 If the consumer ultimately
prevails, he can receive costs, expenses, and attorneys fees in addi-
tion to damages.82 While such suit may be brought in either state or
federal court, the opportunity to litigate in the federal forum requires
a minimum amount in controversy of $50,000.83 Furthermore, as a
prerequisite to bringing a class action in the federal courts, at least
100 plaintiffs must be named and no individual claim can be less
than twenty-five dollars.84 Presumably, Congress imposed these ju-
risdictional limits to prevent trivial or insignificant class actions.
85
(b) Public remedies. -Since noncompliance with any provision
in Title I of the Act also constitutes a violation of Title 1186 either the
Attorney General or the FTC may sue in federal district court to
restrain further nonconformity, regardless of the jurisdictional
amount.87 Alternatively, the FTC may issue cease and desist orders
against warrantors found violating the Act. Some commentators
who interpret the term "Attorney General" in section 2310 as
describing a state official88 deem the remedy provision banal. At
least one court, however, has stressed the novelty of this provision.
In In re General Motors Corporation Engine Interchange Litigation, 89
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the United
States Attorney, rather than his counterpart at the state level, should
enjoin violations of the Act.
F. Preemption of State Law
By not specifically supplanting state or federal law, the Act gen-
erally complements existing consumer rights. State laws affecting li-
ability for personal injury and consequential property damages, for
example, remain applicable." Preemption occurs, however, when
state statutes covering warranty labeling or disclosure attempt to reg-
81. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(i) (1976).
82. Id § 23 10(d)(2). Presumably, since the Act permits an award of attorneys fees based
on actual time expended, a court would need to receive evidence of the attorney's time ex-
pended before making an award. See Jameson Chem. Co. Ltd. v. Love, - Ind. App. - 401
N.E.2d 41 (1980), mod#Fed Ind. App. - 403 N.E.2d 928 (1980). See generally Berger,
Court AwardedAttorneys'Fees." "What Is Reasonable,?" 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1977).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3) (1976).
84. Id
85. See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d 1106, 1114
n.2 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(b) (1976).
87. Id § 2310(c)(1).
88. See Comment, Consumer Warranty Law in California Under the Commercial Code
and the Song-Beverly and Magnson-Mosr Warranty Acts, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583, 674
(1979).
89. 594 F.2d 1106, 1127-28 n.33 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 231 1(b)(2) (1976).
ulate the same area as the Act's disclosure designation.9' Neverthe-
less, if the FTC determines that such state statutes offer consumers
greater protection than the federal enactment, without burdening in-
terstate commerce, no preemption results.
G. Effective Date
Section 2312 stresses that the Act affects only consumer prod-
ucts manufactured prior to six months after the date of enactment.
The FTC subsequently clarified9 2 the effective date by regulation:
the Act covers those consumer products manufactured after July 4,
1975. 93
VI. The Failure of the Act in the Automobile Industry
By promoting full disclosure of warranty terms, detailing mini-
mum requirements for "full" warranties, encouraging the establish-
ment of informal dispute settlement mechanisms, and attempting to
lessen the financial burden of instituting suit, the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act generally protects consumers. For example, only
seven percent of all warranted products are currently delivered with
defects.94 Manufacturers correct eighty-six percent of these defects
within a month, leaving ninety-two percent of the customers con-
cerned satisfied.95 Moreover, competition between manufacturers
has increased the number of home appliances covered by "full"
Magnuson-Moss warranties. 96
Notwithstanding its overall effectiveness, the Act has failed dis-
mally in the automobile industry, largely because each of the "Big
Three" automobile manufacturers offers "limited" rather than "full"
warranties on its products. 97 In particular, the combination of few
mandatory requirements on automobile manufacturers and an ex-
cessive reliance on warrantors voluntary performance emasculates
the efficacy of the Act. Exacerbating these statutory deficiencies, the
automobile industry currently suffers from both a shortage of trained
mechanics and the existence of disparate wage scales for warranty
repairs.
91. Id §2311(c)(1).
92. Some courts have apparently misconstrued the effective date of the Act. For exam-
ple, by noting that the Act would not apply to consumer products manufactured before Janu-
ary 4, 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court implied that the Act would cover articles
manufactured after that date. See Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181
(1975).
93. 16 C.F.R. § 700.2 (1977). When a consumer seeks repair of a consumer product, the
manufacture date of any replacement parts determine coverage.
94. See note 12 and accompanying text supra
95. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM., supra note 12, at 30.
96. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
97. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra
A. Deficiencies of the Act
1. "'Full" versus 'Limited "--The Act's failure to require any
proffer of "full" warranties is a major deficiency, particularly with
respect to the automobile industry. By relying solely on the pres-
sures of a capitalist marketplace, the Act ignores the potential for the
universal offering of inferior warranties in industries dominated by
few manufacturers. For example, competition between automobile
warrantors with respect to warranties is negligible, since ninety-eight
percent of all automobiles are currently sold with only "limited"
warranties.98 Automobile purchasers, therefore, enjoy none of the
substantial rights afforded by "full" warranties. 99 Moreover, because
any implied warranties will probably be severely limited in duration,
automobile purchasers appear particularly vulnerable. Emphasizing
the impact of this problem, consumers are increasingly spending
larger percentages of their total income on automobiles."°
Both the facts and resolution of Ford Motor Company v.
Mayes' illustrate this flaw in the Act. On February 25, 1976, the
plaintiff Mayes purchased a new 1976 Ford pickup truck from an
authorized dealer. Five weeks later, after noticing an unusual noise
and vibrations in the rear of the truck, the plaintiff returned the truck
to the dealer. Even though the dealer replaced the clutch, the noise
persisted. Plaintiff Mayes subsequently returned the truck for repair
eight times but to no avail. Eventually, a frame repair shop deter-
mined that the truck's frame had twisted and diamonded. Evidence
later presented at trial established that such twisting and diamonding
could cause excessive wear and tear. On August 26, 1976, the plain-
tiff finally returned the truck to the dealer with written notice of rev-
ocation of acceptance. °2 The Ford Motor Company refused to
repurchase or replace the truck, claiming that its liability was cir-
cumscribed by a "limited" warranty. 03 In the suit that followed, the
98. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
99. See § III C supra.
100. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
101. 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978).
102. For an examination of the effect of revocation under the U.C.C., see notes 33-36 and
accompanying text supra.
103. The warranty accompanying the sale of the truck provided as follows:
LIMITED WARRANTY 1976 NEW CAR AND LIGHT TRUCK Ford warrants
for 1976 model cars and light trucks sold by Ford that the Selling Dealer will repair
or replace free any parts, except tires, found under normal use in the U.S. or Canada
to be defective in factory materials or workmanship within the earliest of 12 months
or 12,000 miles from either first use or retail delivery. THERE IS NO OTHER EX-
PRESS WARRANTY ON THIS VEHICLE. ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS IS LIMITED TO THE 12 MONTH/12,000
MILE DURATION OF THIS WRITTEN WARRANTY. NEITHER FORD NOR
ANY OF ITS DEALERS SHALL HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOSS OF
USE OF THE VEHICLE, LOSS OF TIME, INCONVENIENCE, COMMERCIAL
LOSS OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
Mayes court agreed that no revocation could occur under the Act,
since the warranty was clearly designated as "limited." Notably, to
resolve the dispute the court necessarily examined the alternative
claims based on the U.C.C. and the state's consumer protection
code. 1°
2. Remedies. -The remedy section of the Act offers little pro-
tection to consumers. Case law and statistics emphasize four statu-
tory deficiencies. First, even though the Act provides that counsel
fees may be awarded to a successful litigant, 0 5 most attorneys and
their clients prefer not to rely upon such speculative awards. Specifi-
cally, in April of 1977, the staff of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer
Protection contacted twenty-one attorneys who had begun to sue au-
tomobile companies under the Act. Most of those contacted indi-
cated that the discretionary nature of fee recovery encouraged
attorneys either to refuse warranty cases altogether or to press for
pretrial settlement. I°
Second, by mandating that 100 plaintiffs be explicitly named in
a class action, 0 7 the Act disregards the reality of an automotive soci-
ety. Searching for the requisite number of suitable plaintiffs before
discovery commences may necessitate a laborious, nationwide effort.
During this investigation an attorney could face a statute of limita-
tions problem or admonition for engaging in the prohibited act of
solicitation.0 8 Unfortunately, this statutory requirement proved dis-
positive in Barr v. General Motors Corporation. 109 After discovering
discoloration and chipping of paint on her new automobile, plaintiff
Barr brought a class action on behalf of herself and all other pur-
chasers of 1977 Chevrolet automobiles which were defectively
painted. Despite assuming that the aggregate of individual claims in
excess of $25 would probably reach the $50,000 minimum jurisdic-
tional amount, the court dismissed the case because 100 plaintiffs
had not been named in the complaint. Neither the plaintiffs infor-
mation and belief that the class actually encompassed several thou-
sand persons nor the possibility of subsequent identification
persuaded the court to certify the class.
Third, inconsistent decisions have resulted from the Act's
neglecting to specify whether punitive damages may be awarded to a
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ky. 1978).
104. Notably, the court did grant relief under the state commercial and consumer protec-
tion laws.
105. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra
106. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM., supra note 12, at 34.
107. See note 84 and accompanying text supra
108. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM., supra note 12, at 34.
109. 80 F.R.D. 136 (S.D. Ohio 1978). See also Watts v. Volkswagen Artiengesellschaft
[sic], 488 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Ar. 1980); Barnette v. Chrysler Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1167 (D.
Neb. 1977).
successful litigant. For example, a federal district court in No vosel v.
Northway Motor Car Corporation"I° held that punitive damages
were not recoverable under the Act. Looking to the U.C.C. for gui-
dance, the court found that commercial laws only allow compensa-
tory damages for breach of warranty. Thus, the court held that
punitive damages were not available under the Act. In juxtaposition
to the Novosel holding, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opined
in In re General Motors Corporation Engine Interchange Litigation "'
that punitive damages might be recoverable. Justifying their disa-
greement with the court in Novosel, the court noted that the Act
broadly provides for damages and other legal and equitable relief.
Last, the laudable informal dispute settlement mechanisms en-
visioned by the Act remain virtually nonexistent. Since the Act
merely encourages but fails to require the establishment of such
schemes, very few have been created by automobile manufacturers.
Currently, the Ford Motor Company operates three complaint-reso-
lution boards, while General Motors sponsors two. "1 2 This failure to
establish settlement mechanisms appears particularly harmful in
light of the achievements of independently-organized mecha-
nisms. ' 13
B. The Intricacies of the Automobile Industry
Intricacies of the automobile industry magnify the weaknesses
apparent in the Act, engendering a warranty crisis. Recent statistical
compilations evaluating automobile warranty performance unequiv-
ocally demonstrate the existence of such a crisis. For example,
nearly thirty percent of all new motor vehicles delivered contain de-
fects. Forty percent of these defects require repeated visits to deal-
ers, while thirty percent take longer than a month to correct.
Accordingly, fifty-seven and one-half percent of all automobile-re-
lated complaints concern vehicles still under warranty.' '4
Poor vehicle design and incompetent repair service appear par-
tially responsible for the crisis. According to National Highway
Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) estimates, consumers
lose $2 billion annually because of poor vehicle design."I5 Allegedly,
designers frequently produce styles that require nonstandard parts or
excessively difficult repair techniques. 16 Concurrently, the NHTSA
110. 460 F. Supp. 541, 545 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
11I. 594 F.2d 1106, 1132-33 n.44 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
112. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM., supra note 12, at 26-27.
113. Forty-four AUTOCAP programs, developed by the National Automobile Dealers
Association report a satisfactory resolution rate of 65 to 70%. Id
114. Id at 29.
115. Id at 35.
116. Id at 35-36. For example, in order to remove the transmission on some Ford Pintos,
a mechanic must remove the gear shift and handle. Preliminarily, he spends an estimated two
submits that incompetent or unnecessary repairs constitute $20 bil-
lion of the $50 billion annual expenditures for auto repair and main-
tenance.' 7 Rather than fraud, over-frequent preventive
maintenance and a general inability of auto mechanics to diagnose
defects properly account for this loss.' This conclusion clearly
comports with the National Institute for Automotive Service Excel-
lence's (NIASE) postulation that only fifty percent of all practicing
mechanics could pass the NIASE mechanic certification test." 9
Exacerbating this basic problem of incompetence, the disparate
rates paid by manufacturers for warranty work create a substantial
disincentive for providing adequate warranty service. Basically, the
hourly labor rate multiplied by a warranty flatrate time determines a
mechanic's pay.'2 ° Since the flatrate time specified for warranty re-
pairs is generally lower than that listed for retail repairs, a mechanic
receives substantially less remuneration for warranty work. Simi-
larly, dealers receive less reimbursement for parts provided on war-
ranty repairs than for those sold for retail repair services. Moreover,
when conscientious dealers choose to honor warranties, a severe
shortage of replacement parts limits their efforts. While the Ford
Motor Company has recently established twenty-one parts ware-
houses across the country,121 a spokesman for the company concedes
that the problem cannot be rectified so easily: "While Ford contin-
ues to seek systems improvements, parts availability problems will
never be completely eliminated because of the great diversity and
volumes of parts required to service the millions of Ford products on
the road."' 22
V. Possibilities for Rectifying the Automobile Warranty Crisis
A. Proposed Amendments to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
In an attempt to rectify the present warranty crisis, Senator Met-
zenbaum and Congressman Eckhardt recently sponsored companion
bills to amend the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as it applies to
automobile warranties. 123 On August 3, 1979, before introducing
this proposed legislation, Senator Metzenbaum explained:
I am today introducing the Automobile Full Warranty Act of
1979, legislation designed to help eliminate one major source of
consumer complaint-poor automobile warranty performance.
to three hours removing seats, console, and floor covering before he can reach the gear shift
and handle. Id
117. Id at 11.
118. Id at 14.
119. Id
120. Id at 31.
121. Id
122. Id
123. S. 1701, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1005, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Today, the consumer faces one chance in three that his or her
new car will be delivered with a defect or problem. But under
current automobile warranty systems, these owners can expect lit-
tle relief. Not only must they bear the inconvenience and frustra-
tion involved in having defective vehicles repaired, but in many
instances, they are forced to take time off from work to pay for
alternate transportation while their new car is in the shop.
Automobile warranty systems work against the consumer.
Too often they offer empty promises to the new car buyer.
Unfortunately, with respect to automobiles, warranty per-
formance has not improved as much as many of us had hoped,
largely because the Big Three auto manufacturers have chosen to
offer limited rather than full warranties on their products.' 24
While provisions of the two bills appear startlingly similar, vital
differences exist. Essentially, the amendments proposed by the
house bill seem less comprehensive. Enactment of either bill, how-
ever, would substantially benefit automobile purchasers.
Z Senate Bill 1701-In its current form, Senate Bill 1701 envi-
sions three basic amendments to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
First, the Act's definitional section would be expanded to accommo-
date additional terms. Second, section 2304 minimum federal war-
ranty standards would apply to any written warranties for passenger
motor vehicles. Last, existing statutory remedies would become revi-
talized.
(a) Definitional additions. -Section 2301 of the Act would add
two new terms, "passenger motor vehicle" and "warranty dispute
resolution system." "Passenger motor vehicle" is defined as an auto-
motive vehicle, designed for carrying twelve or fewer persons.'
25
"Warranty dispute resolution system" or "system" would embrace
any informal dispute settlement mechanism, including any combina-
tion of arbitration, mediation, and conciliation procedures available
for resolving consumer warranty disputes.
(b) Mandatory provision of "full" warranties. -Significantly,
the Senate amendments would make the section 2304 provisions ap-
plicable to all written warranties on passenger motor vehicles. These
amendments would prevent any further issuance of "limited" auto-
mobile warranties. Automobile purchasers receiving written war-
ranties would enjoy the following rights: to have defects cured by
manufacturers within a reasonable time and without charge; to re-
124. 125 CONG. REC. S.11691 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
125. The definition excludes motorcycles and passenger-carrying trucks. See S.1701, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 105(b)(16) (1979).
ceive implied warranties of unlimited duration; to be entitled to con-
sequential damages for breach of written or implied warranties,
unless an exclusion or limitation conspicuously appears on the face
of the warranty; and to elect either refund for or replacement of the
product without additional charge, if the defect remains irreparable
after a reasonable number of attempts to remedy malfunctions have
been made by the warrantor. If an automobile manufacturer were to
offer no written warranty, however, this mandate would not apply.
(c) Remedies. -The four changes proposed for section 2310
should dramatically increase the efficacy of existing remedies. First,
each manufacturer or importer of new passenger motor vehicles
would be required to offer comprehensive warranty dispute resolu-
tion systems to consumers before January 1, 1982. For impartiality
and accessibility, the systems would operate under FTC guidelines.
Basically, the amendments would require that warrantors inform
consumers publicly of the system's availability for resolving legal
and factual disputes. Should consumers elect to submit their dis-
putes, they would not be bound by decisions unless they wished to
be. Decisions would automatically bind automobile manufacturers,
however, and would become admissible in subsequent proceedings.
Second, the bill would amend section 2310(d) of the Act to make
an award of attorneys fees to successful litigants mandatory. No
longer could courts exercise discretion in awarding fees. Third, fed-
eral courts would enjoy jurisdiction over class actions if the defend-
ant merely stipulated that the proposed class consisted of at least 100
plaintiffs. Moreover, unless a reasonable opportunity to conduct
pertinent discovery had been provided, no court could dismiss an
action commenced in federal court for lack of named plaintiffs.
Last, during the pendency of any suit brought under the Act, the
consumer would be entitled to retain possession and use of the motor
vehicle.
2. House Bill 1005. -House bill 1005 demonstrates great simi-
larity to the Senate proposal. Basically, three features coincide with
the Senate bill: "full" designation becomes mandatory when a writ-
ten warranty is provided, counsel fees must be awarded to successful
litigants, and owners may retain their vehicles during the pendency
of proceedings. Because minor differences exist, however, the House
bill appears to be weaker. While the House proposal offers all auto-
mobile purchasers broad remedies under section 2304, the bill would
nevertheless allow "full" warrantors to limit the duration of implied
warranties. Furthermore, the bill makes no provision for establish-
ing informal dispute settlement mechanisms. Since these informal
devices would probably provide speedy, inexpensive resolutions,
their absence enervates the bill somewhat.
B. Concomitant Remedies Needed Under the U. C C
• Even if Congress amends the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
equivalent forms of relief under each state's commercial code would
still be needed by aggrieved automobile purchasers. Clearly, the po-
tential for automobile warrantors to avoid all liability under
Magnuson-Moss by neglecting to provide any sort of written war-
ranty would remain. Moreover, a purchaser choosing not to avail
himself of an informal dispute settlement mechanism could resort to
U.C.C. remedies. If the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is not suita-
bly amended, consumers will require strong protection from com-
mercial laws.
Unfortunately, buyers attempting to utilize U.C.C. remedies
currently encounter two major hurdles. First, a written warranty
may state that it provides an exclusive remedy. If this provision is
deemed controlling, a purchaser will be foreclosed from resorting to
any other remedy. Second, the warranty may also exclude or limit
recovery of consequential damages.'26 Judicial clarification appears
necessary for adequate resolution of either situation.
1. The Exclusive Remedy. -Any consumer seeking remedies
other than those specifically provided in a written warranty will at-
tempt to invoke subsection 2-719(2) of the U.C.C. This subsection
permits an aggrieved party to resort to all U.C.C. remedies when
circumstances cause an exclusive or a limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose. Determining precisely when such a failure occurs,
however, may prove extremely difficult.
1 27
An emerging judicial trend that equates failure of essential pur-
pose of a remedy with deprivation of the substantial basis of the
bargain increasingly permits aggrieved buyers to revoke acceptance
and recover damages. Such courts seek guidance from the
"unenacted,"' 28 official commentary to section 2-719, which provides
in pertinent part: "[U]nder subsection (2), where an apparently fair
and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose
or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the
bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of the
Article."' 29 The court in Ford Motor Company v. Mayes 3' deter-
126. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
127. See generally Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential Failure of Purpose.-
A Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 S.W.L.J. 759 (1977).
128. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, at 11.
129. U.C.C. § 2-719, Comment 1.
130. 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1978).
mined that defects in the truck had substantially impaired its value
to the buyer, causing the limited remedy under the warranty of
merely repair and replacement of parts, to fail of its essential pur-
pose. Only as long as courts uniformly construe section 2-719(2), in
this manner, may buyers be spared harsh results.
2. Consequential Damages. -Neither case law nor U.C.C.
commentary determines how an exclusive remedy's failure of essen-
tial purpose affects the availability of consequential damages. By
providing that a remedy's failure of its essential purpose entitles a
purchaser to resort to an Article 2 remedy, subsection 2-719(2) im-
plies that a successful litigant could even receive consequential dam-
ages. Conversely, subsection 2-719(3) proposes that an
unconscionability standard alone determines recovery of conse-
quential damages.
Although courts and commentators have not reconciled these
seemingly discordant provisions, two writers have recently presented
a satisfactory solution with three distinct standards.' 3' First, when-
ever an exclusion operates to cause a remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, consequential damages should be allowed. In support of
this view, U.C.C. draftsmanship fails to preclude it and any outcome
would comport with good policy. Second, where parties have agreed
to a limited or an exclusive remedy, only consequential damages re-
sulting from the seller's failure to provide that remedy should be
awarded. Last, whenever an exclusion proves unconscionable, re-
gardless of failure of essential purpose, consequential damages
should be awarded.
V. Conclusion
Both state commercial laws and the federal Magunson-Moss
Warranty Act fail to protect automobile purchasers adequately. By
generally permitting warrantors to disclaim liability and to limit
remedies available to consumers, these enactments significantly
weaken the position of buyers. Because weak existing legislation has
engendered an automobile warranty crisis, expeditious resolution is
required.
Basically, revision of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in con-
junction with judicial clarification of the U.C.C. section 2-719 could
provide consumers with the requisite panacea. In particular, adop-
tion of Senate Bill 1701, with its myriad of provisions rectifying orig-
inal oversights in draftsmanship, should better protect consumers.
Concomitant judicial clarification of U.C.C. section 2-719 should
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sufficiently protect those consumers not embraced within the ambit
of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
